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法学论文/姚俊

作者:法律资料网 时间:2024-07-22 10:26:49  浏览:8094   来源:法律资料网
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 宪政理念下的行政补偿制度价值定位
         作者:姚俊  
            南昌大学法学院

摘要:在以人权保障和权力限制为核心的宪政理念下,行政补偿的价值在于它是作为财产权社会化和人权保障的平衡机制,二者矛盾冲突的协调机制。我国的行政补偿制度应该在这种价值定位下,予以完善。


关键词: 宪政 行政补偿 价值


引言
行政补偿是指为公共利益,行政主体合法的运行行政权力而给公民带来的损失给予补偿的制度。它涉及国家行政权与公民财产权、效率与公平、公益与私益之间的关系。因此,它不仅仅是政府行使公权力的一种具体行政行为,更体现了国家公共权力与私人权利尤其是财产权之间的关系这一宪政的根基性主题。在以人权保障和政府权力限制为核心的宪政理念下,它的价值就在于平衡了财产权的保护与限制的矛盾冲突。一方面,行政补偿制度肯定了行政征收征用的必要性;另一方面,行政补偿制度保障了公民个人的财产权。本文分四个部分来论证此题。第一部分阐述宪政理念的内涵。第二部分从个人权利和社会责任两个方面来论述财产权的双重性。第三部分结合宪政理念论证行政补偿的平衡价值。第四部分回归本文主题。

一、 宪政内涵——以保障人权为核心的一种政治形态或过程
在今天,宪政在国际上是一个普遍承认的,不受批评的,没有争议的东西。实现宪政是当今世界所有立宪国家的目标 。那么,宪政到底是指什么?目前,我国大多数的学者都认为:宪政是以宪法为前提 ,以民主政治为核心 ,以法治为基石 ,以保障人权为目的的政治形态或政治过程。[1]从一定意义上讲,宪政实际上就是一个社会反复出现的按照宪法的条文与精神而展开的政治运作及其习惯,是一个民族长久以来形成的文化传统与道德观念在政治层面的折射,是人类社会政治智慧和经验的积累与结晶,它所赖以建立的基础不是一部完美的成文宪法,而是一个民族、一个社会由来已久所形成的对法治的信仰与崇拜、对权力的警惕与防范、对人权的尊重与珍视等政治经验和文化基因。大众化的、社会普遍认知的宪法文化是宪政国家形成的前提。[2]由此可见,宪政是基于文化传统而生的一种现象,是沿着文化的发展脉络而形成的关于政治运作的一种思想。它是在法治基础上以保障公民权利和限制国家权力为内核的。主张民主政治、法治和人权保障的密切结合融为一体 。宪政作为一种合理的制度,是近代西方资产阶级革命的产物,体现着西方基本的价值准则和观念,蕴含着他们对人与社会、人与国家关系的理解,对诸如自由、民主、平等等价值的体现,也包容着人们对宪政本身的感知、了悟、信念和忠诚。[3]笔者认为,宪政至少包含以下基本理念:

(一) 宪法至上
宪法是公民权利的保障书,是对一国民主事实的确认。宪法是宪政的规范表现形式,宪政是宪法规范在实践中的实现。 在宪政的理念下,要有最高权威的宪法的存在和实施。有宪法不一定有宪政,但是有宪政肯定有宪法。宪法作为一国的根本法或基本法,在内容上,规定了国家最根本、最重要的问题;在法律效力上,具有最高性。一切法律、行政法规和地方性法规都不得与宪法的精神和原则相违背。它是普通法律制定的依据,任何的机关、团体、组织和个人都必须遵守,任何违反宪法的行为都应当受到制裁。这就要求宪法必须真实有效、稳定持续。建立违宪审查制度,维护宪法的最高权威。使国家权力在宪法的规范范围内发挥行使。为了使社会公约不至于成为一纸空文,他就默契的包含着这样一种规定——唯有这一规定才能使得其他规定具有力量——即任何人不服从公意的,全体就要迫使他服从公意。[4]

(二) 民主政治是核心
民主政治是一种奉行多数人统治的政治制度,是与君主制、寡头制和独裁制相对立的一种比较完整、崇尚理性的国家体制和政治制度。 宪政与民主政治有着紧密联系。可以说,没有民主政治的建立和实现,就不会有宪政的出现。宪政就是民主政治,就是用宪法规定国家的体制、政治组织以及政府和人民相互之间的权利和义务关系,从而使政府和人民都在这些规定之下,享受应享受的权利,负担应负担的义务,无论谁都不许违反和超越这些规定自由行动的一种政治形态。[5] 这样,将国家权力和公民权利放在宪法规定的范围内,限制国家权力以保障公民权利。现代民主政治的宗旨就在于:建立可以容纳各社会阶层、各利益群体代表的政治体制,既实现社会成员之间公开、理性的自由竞争,又满足他们对平等的一般期待,从而在制度方面为长期政治稳定和社会发展创造基本条件。[6] 君主的统治意志就只是,或者只能是公意或法律,他的力量只不过是集中在他身上的公共力量罢了;只要他想使自己获得某种绝对的、独立的行为,整体的联系开始涣散。[7]民主政治的关键在于确立主权在民的原则。主权在民原则意味着国家权力来源于人民,国家权力是实现公民权利的手段。国家权力存在的唯一目的在于保障对公民权利的有效实施。
(三) 确立法治原则
法治,是指严格依照法律治理国家的政治主张、制度体系和运作过程。它包含一个国家以宪法为基础的法律和法律制度由静态到动态的运行过程。[8] 它是与人治相对应的一种政治主张。任何个人的意志都不能超越法律,都必须在法律的框架内发挥作用。它倡导社会的公平正义、对专断权力的否定和对民主政治的维护,这与宪政的内涵是相一致的。民主和法治是宪政的两个重要方面,二者不能偏废,否则,宪政价值就难以实现。民主可以保证大多数人的意见得到实现,但是没有法治就很难保障那少数人的利益,也很难保证所谓的民主不是“专制民主”。宪政与法治是密不可分的。
(四) 人权保障
人权保障是宪政的内核,要保障人权就必须限制政府的权力,这是一个目的和手段的关系。人权是指人作为人应该享有的权利,是一个人生存发展所必须的权利。其外延广义地指人在社会生活中所享有的政治、经济和文化等各项自由平等权利的总称。有学者提出,人权在层次划分和范畴归属中具有应有人权、法定人权和实有人权三种形态。 [9] 应有人权是人权的应然状态,法定人权是法律上规定了的公民权利也称公民权,实有人权是在现实生活中,在法律的实施过程中切实得到维护的公民权利。世界宪政发展史也就是人权确认和保障的斗争史。自近代宪法问世以来,对公民权利的确认便成为宪法固有的一个组成部分。宪法对公民基本权利的规定实际是对应有人权的一种选择确认;宪法的深化和发展过程的表现之一,就是这种选择确认的范围不断扩大、层次不断加深的过程。但被宪法确认为公民基本权利的人权也仅仅是作为法定权利中具有普遍性、基本性和母体性的人权。尽管宪法赋予了基本人权以最高的法律意义,设立了各具体部门法对公民权利进一步保护的最高法律依据。但经验表明,在许多情况下,真正的关键问题并非基本权利是否得到伦理道德的应然认可,也不是它能否在宪法上得到规定,而是它能否在实际上得到承认和保障。只有当人们真正地享有权利时,它才是现实的、有意义的权利。应当权利再神圣,法定权利再完备,如果得不到实现,都是一句空话,而实有权利的完成或实现却离不开宪政。宪政实践的目标之一就是促成法定人权向实有人权的转化、发展,宪政是法定人权与实有人权之间的枢纽和中介。没有宪政,人权保障仅仅停留在宪法条文的静态之中,而不可能表现为公民的实际享有。[10]
综上,不难得知在宪政的理论框架内人权保障是目的,政府权力限制是手段,只有通过宪法和宪政对政府权力的约束和限制,才能保障人权。由此可见,基于建构宪政制度,对于宪政的终极价值诉求之人权保障是不得不考虑的。而在当代随着社会发展,作为个人权利核心的财产权越来越具有双重性。

二、 财产权的双重性——个人权利和社会责任并存
(一)财产权——个人权利的核心
一般意义上的财产权指的是一种个人权利,即公民对其财产可自由拥有(即排他性的和永久性的控制)、使用、管理(决定由谁使用以及怎样使用财产)、收益(从个人使用或他人使用中获得利益)或处分(包括转让、赠与、遗赠、消费、浪费、改变以及销毁等)。[11]人们对财产的排他性的和永久性的控制既反映了人与物之间的关系,也实质上体现了人与人之间的关系。宪法上的财产权和民法上的财产权是有区别的。宪法中的财产权乃属于宪法上的一种基本权利,与宪法上的其他权利一样,均是公民针对国家而享有的一种权利,即公民所享有的、为国家权力所不能不法侵害的一种权利,直接的反映了公民与国家权利之间在宪法秩序中的关系;而民法上的财产权主要属于公民对抗公民、或私人对抗私人的一种权利,由此形成了作为平等主体的私人之间的财产关系。[12]财产权作为宪法上的基本权利是有其历史渊源的。
洛克在《政府论》中指出,不论我们就自然理性来说,人类一出生即享有生存权利,上帝既将世界给予人类共有,亦给予他们以理性,让他们为了生活和便利的最大好处而加以利用,土地和其中的一切,都是给人们用来维持他们的生存和舒适生活的。财产权的思想源头在自然法思想中可以找到,近代资产阶级革命始终充斥着财产权保护的斗争。随着近代国家的产生,封建历史的终结,统治权和土地所有权开始分离,分别归属于国家和个人。特别是经过近代资产阶级革命,财产权的宪法保障得以确立。1789年法国《人权宣言》第17条把财产权宣称为一种“神圣不可侵犯的权利”。 被作为人类历史上第一部宪法性文件的《自由大宪章》,其核心内容就是关于自由和财产的保障:“未经全国公意许可,国王不得征收任何免役税和贡金”,“凡自由民 ,非经其具有同等身份的人依法审判或者依照王国的法律规定 ,不得加以扣留、监禁、没收其财产”。“财产权神圣不可侵犯原则”是 17、18 世纪资产阶级革命的产物,它强调财产权是公民作为人所固有的权利 ,或作为一个人与生俱来的。不允许国家权力的任何侵犯。
财产权是一项极其重要的权利,它与经济、政治以及个人发展都具有密切联系,应当成为宪法上的一项基本权利。
1、在经济方面,财产权的保障和市场经济的要求是一脉相承的。经济要繁荣,就必须对财产权进行保护。人类的生存和发展有赖于财富的拥有和积累,没有明确的财富归属关系,任何人也就没有积极性去充分的利用它或防止被侵犯。在私有制社会产生以后 ,财富与个人之间才有了固定的归属关系 ,这种具体明确的归属关系 ,为人类的生存和发展 ,为社会进步和财富积累带来了自发的不息的动力 ,也带来了国家和法律对这种财富归属关系的确认和保护的责任和权力 ,从而使财富在法律上变成了财产 ,财富归属关系变成了法律上的财产权。[13]只有这样,才能在促进经济发展的同时,保障公民具有对国家权力进行限制抗衡的物质基础。
2、从财产权与政治的关系来讲,财产权是公民享有自由,免受国家任意干涉的必要条件。米尔顿.弗里德曼曾写道:当财富为众多的所有者所分享的时候,独立行动的各个所有者就难以对特定的个人的命运和自由进行独断性的决定,为此,从比较政治的观点而言,个人的经济自由得到广泛保障的国家,一般也存在相对广泛的政治自由。[14]宪法保障公民的财产权,一方面保护了市民社会形成壮大的物质条件,有益于社会秩序的稳定,防止来自公共权力对人民财产权的侵害;另一方面,也有益于保护公共财产,使公共财产更加充分有效地为公民谋福利。
3、财产权是个人权利的基础,是实现其他权利的前提。如果财产权没有得到充分的保障,公民个人的其他权利也就丧失了实现的物质基础。当个人的财产权得不到保障时,个人不仅不可能对自己的行为承担责任,更不可能产生通过自己生产性的劳动来创造新的财富的动机,整个社会中人与人之间的关系就将处于混乱无序的状态。没有财产权作为依托的其他权利和自由只是空洞的权利和自由,不仅个人的生存失去了动力和条件,而且个人的自由也失去了保障。[15]可以说,没有财产权的充分有效的保障,个人的自我发展、人格健全就很难得以实现,文明社会的状态就迟迟不能进入。
另外,从政府的产生、职责来看,财产权是公民的极其重要的始源性的个人权利。创制政府的行为决不是一项契约,而只是一项法律;行政权力的受任者绝不是人民的主人,而只是人民的官吏;只要人民愿意就可以委任他们,也可以撤换他们。[16]政治权力就是为了规定和保护财产而制定法律的权利,判处死刑和一切较轻处分的权利,以及使用共同体的力量来执行这些法律和保卫国家不受外来侵害的权利;而这一切都只是为了公共福利。[17]人民在自然状态种享有那种权利,但这种权利享有是很不稳定的,有不断受别人侵犯的威胁。对财产权的享有就很不安全、很不稳妥。这就使他们愿意放弃一种尽管自由却是充满着恐惧和经常危险的状况;因而他并非毫无理由地设法和甘愿同已经或有意联合起来的其他人们一起加入社会,以互相保护他们的生命、特权和地产,即我根据一般的名称称之为财产的东西。因此人们联合成为国家和置身于政府之下的重大的和主要的目的,是保护他们的财产。[18] 可见,政府的唯一的目的在保护公民的财产权,其存在的唯一的合理性基础乃是为公众福利。
财产权的保障有其历史渊源,对政治、经济以及个人的发展都具有重要作用,政府成立的目的是为增进公共福祉的。各国宪法对财产权的保障都有明确规定,但也同时规定财产权的行使范围,对财产权进行合理的限制。
(二)财产权的社会责任(社会义务)
个人对其所有之财产拥有占有、使用、收益、处分的绝对自由,“人们联合成为国家和置身于政府之下的重大的和主要的目的,便是保护他们的财产”。这成为财产个人主义、所有权绝对思想的基石。财产权在一般的意义上指的是政府不得任意侵犯私人对自己拥有的财产的自由支配,但这样的财产权因保障了既得权利而与社会权背道而驰,因为有效实现社会权利是需要对财富和资源进行重新分配的。因此,财产权另一方面的意义是指财产权只能是在一定范围内的财产权。[19]这种定义可以从西方早期的启蒙思想中获得佐证。比如说:集体的每个成员,在形成集体的那一瞬间,便把当时实际情况下所存在的自己——他本身和他的全部力量,而他所享有的财富也构成其中的一部分——献给了集体。 [20] 社会契约使民主政治法治化的逻辑起点和历史起点,是天赋人权的逻辑发展。社会契约论的国家学说是建立在自由合意的契约这一观念基础之上的。其要义是:自然状态下的人们在自然法的指引下,在自由、平等的基础上就某些自然权利的交换达成其协议,并依据协议建立国家,制定宪法和法律,从而得到一种确定的社会秩序以保护自己的天赋人权。[21]可见,财产权保障产生之初就已伴随着对财产权的限制,具有相对性。要求每个人在主张自己的财产权时,同时应尊重别人的财产,还得考虑公共利益的需要。
个人的权利自由被放大到已经严重影响人们权利行使和社会经济发展,使得资本主义私有经济的发展引发一系列社会问题。特别是随着工业化社会的到来,贫富分化的悬殊、市场机制的失灵、社会矛盾的加剧等一系列问题,使得国家对社会经济的大规模介入和干预不可避免。福利国、行政国成为人们不得不接受的现实,绝对的财产权理论更是显现出难以克服的弊端。
进入20世纪之后,许多传统的资本主义国家先后或多或少地采行社会改良主义的方式,企图在维持资本主义私有制的前提下,相对限制私人财产权,强调公共福利,从而实现了从近代自由国家向现代社会福利国家的转型。[22]不仅国家的积极行动改变着财产权神圣不可侵犯的定理,而且学术界也开始对过去的私有财产神圣不可侵犯的学说进行了反思,形成了各种不同的理论学说。
19世纪末德国学者耶林倡导的所有权义务论、法国宪法学者狄冀倡导的社会连带主义就是其中代表。所有权义务论亦称为所有权社会化理念,耶林在其名作《论法律的目的》一书中指出,所有权行使的目的,不应仅为个人的利益,同时亦应当成为社会的利益。人们的所有权之所以受到他人的尊重,是因为它具有有益于社会的机能。狄冀认为,人在社会中生存,它永远并只能和其他同类一起在社会中生存;人类是一个原始的自然实体,绝不是人类意愿的产物,因而所有人无论过去、现在,或者将来都是人类群体的一部分。人们虽然各有所需,但此种需要绝非个人之力所能满足,而只能通过共同生活才能获得满足。 由此可知,“人”,一方面是独立的个人,另一方面则是社会中的一分子。由于其是独立的个人,所以有其独立的特殊性;由于其为社会中的一分子,故又具有社会连带性。耶林的所有权义务论和狄冀的社会连带主义法学理论打破了近代以来将财产权视为个人自由的基础和限制政府权力手段的神话,使人们认识到财产权不过是与其他权利无甚区别的法律权利,并非公民自治的渊源和对国家权力的限制。 [23]
这些理论的提出和探析不仅为我们认识财产权社会化的深层原因,同时也为财产权形态的这种转变提供了相应的理论依据。与上述理论相联系 ,宪法对公民的财产权由绝对保护转向相对保护。以保障基本权利的存在为前提 ,以保障公共利益的实现为目的。
财产权利观的这种剧烈变化直接反映到了宪法条文之上。自 1919 年德国魏玛宪法以来各国宪法都抛弃了私人财产权绝对、不受任何限制的理念,转而倡导对私人财产权进行必要的限制。如魏玛宪法第 153 条第 1 款规定:“所有权,受宪法之保障。其内容及限制,由法律规定之”;第 3 款规定:“财产伴随着义务。其行使必须同时有益于公共福利”。战后日本宪法第29条规定:“财产权不得侵犯”;“财产权之内容,应由法律规定以期适合于公共福利”。法国1946年第四共和国宪法序言,其第9段规定:“一切的财产、一切的企业的收益,都具有国家的公共义务和事实上的独占的性质••••••”
特别是二战后各国宪法的发展更加体现了财产权利观的变化,对私有财产给予了更多的限制或课以更多的义务。从各国宪法规定来看,在现代社会国家里,私人财产权作为一项基本人权要受到以下一些限制:第一,财产权“伴随着义务”,即财产所有人有使用其财产的义务,否则得由有使用能力之人使用其财产。第二,财产权的内容和范围“由法律规定”,即有关财产权在一般状态下的边界,由立法机关在合理的自由裁量范围内通过具体的立法来创设。第三,在一定条件下,国家行为可依照一定程序直接限制乃至剥夺私人财产权,如各国宪法中规定的征收、征用、国有化、没收、财产刑等。当代各国普遍存在一种“私法公法化”现象,最明显的表现便是“所有权的行使日益受公法的限制”。[24]
因此,当财产权神圣、绝对的神话被打破时,宪法便赋予政府基于公共利益的需要对私人财产进行征收征用的权力。基于这种宪法授权,无论财产所有者是否愿意,政府均可按照法律规定的条件强制取得私人之财产。这样,政府基于社会公益的需要享有的征收权构成了对个人财产权的实质性的制约,反过来为了保护个人财产权,宪法又对政府的这种征收设置种种限制。从来没有哪个制度否认过政府的征收权,重要的是征收的法律限制。[25]因为这种限制是在以人权保障为核心的宪政理念下和财产权社会化的背景下所必须的。
从以上的阐述我们可以知道,财产权是公民的基本权利 ,是公民个人权利的核心、基础,要保障公民真正的自由和尊严 ,国家必须对公民的财产权予以最大限度的维护与尊重。同时,由于财产权的社会性被法律所确认,公民的个人财产权具有促进公共利益实现的义务,必须为实现为公共福祉作出应有的牺牲,受到各种各样的限制。正如学者张千帆所说:财产权的概念包含了个人权利与社会责任这两个相互矛盾的要素。财产权的内涵,应从个人权利和社会责任这对矛盾的协调中来把握,应从限制国家干涉财产权的角度来把握。财产权中的个人权利与社会责任的冲突与协调,集中体现在一个国家的财产征收或征用制度上。 [26]那么,如何在保护与限制之间取得平衡呢?行政补偿制度应运而生,发挥平衡价值。

三、 行政补偿制度价值的定位——一种平衡机制
行政补偿或称行政损失补偿或公法上的损失补偿,是指为了实现国家和社会公共利益而合法地给特定人的财产带来特别损失时,基于保障财产权和平等负担的原则,对该损失予以弥补的行为和制度。[27]
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上海市查处专利违法行为办法

上海市知识产权局


上海市查处专利违法行为办法

 


  第一条 为有效地查处专利违法行为,维护和规范社会主义市场经济秩序,根据《中华人民共和国专利法》、《上海市专利保护条例》、《专利行政执法办法》和其他有关法律、行政法规和规章,结合本市实际情况,制定本办法。

  第二条 本办法所称的专利违法行为,是指假冒他人专利、冒充专利行为以及为假冒他人专利、冒充专利行为提供生产经营便利的行为。
  本办法所称的为假冒他人专利、冒充专利行为提供生产经营便利的行为,是指为假冒他人专利、冒充专利行为印制或者提供专利标记、以及为假冒他人专利、冒充专利的行为提供摊位、仓储、运输、隐匿、宣传、广告等便利的行为。

  第三条 查处专利违法行为,应当以事实为依据、以法律为准绳,遵循全面、客观、公正、及时的原则。

  第四条 在本市范围内,查处专利违法行为、接受公众对专利违法行为的举报适用本办法。

  第五条 上海市知识产权局(以下简称市知识产权局)负责查处本市行政区域内的专利违法行为。
区(县)知识产权局应当协助市知识产权局查处专利违法行为。

  第六条 行政执法人员应当依法按照下列要求进行行政检查:
(一)向当事人或有关人员出示行政执法证;
(二)告知检查的依据、内容和要求;
(三)检查或者询问应当制作笔录;
(四)进行行政检查时,执法人员不少于两人,并应统一着装,规范用语。

  第七条 行政执法人员经检查未发现专利违法行为或者发现有涉嫌专利违法行为,经核实排除嫌疑的,应当及时通知当事人。

  第八条 市、区(县)知识产权局接受公众对专利违法行为的举报,对举报的内容及时进行核实。经核实,专利违法行为不存在的,应及时通知举报人。

  第九条 市知识产权局在执法检查或者接受举报发现专利违法行为的,应当在5日内立案,并指定两名或者两名以上持有行政执法证的案件承办人员进行查处。

  第十条 案件承办人员有下列情形之一的,应当自行回避,当事人也可以用口头或者书面形式申请其回避:
(一)是本案当事人、代理人近亲属的;
(二)与本案有利害关系的;
(三)与本案当事人有其他关系,可能影响对案件公正查处的。
当事人提出回避申请,应当说明理由。以口头形式提出回避申请的,受理回避申请的人员应当制作陈述笔录。市知识产权局应当在5日内对回避申请作出书面答复,并通知当事人。被申请回避的人员在市知识产权局作出是否回避的答复前,应当暂停参与本案工作,但案件需要采取紧急措施的除外。

  第十一条 案件承办人员的调查行为应符合本办法第六条第一款第(一)、(四)项的要求。
  调查应当听取当事人的陈述和申辩,应当制作陈述笔录或者询问笔录,笔录应当交当事人或者有关人员审核无误后逐页签名或者盖章。当事人或者有关人员拒绝签名或者盖章的,案件承办人员应当在笔录上注明。

  第十二条 案件承办人员根据案情需要可以要求当事人提供与案件有关的合同、图纸、帐册等资料和物品,也可以向有关单位或者个人查阅与案件有关的资料。
案件承办人员在收集证据时,可以采取抽样取证的方式;在证据可能灭失或者以后难以取得的情况下,经市知识产权局负责人批准,可以先行登记保存,并在7日内作出处理决定。
市知识产权局进行抽样取证或者登记保存的,应当制作笔录,笔录应当由案件承办人员、被调查的单位或者个人签名或者盖章。

  第十三条 案件承办人员核实证据材料,查阅、复制有关的合同、图纸、帐册资料,现场检查、摄录与案件有关的物品时,应当通知当事人及有关人员到场。涉及当事人商业秘密的,案件承办人员应予以保密。

  第十四条 调查终结,案件承办人员应当制作案件调查终结报告,根据调查结果,提出下列建议:
(一)专利违法行为事实清楚,依法予以相应的行政处罚;
(二)违法行为轻微并及时纠正,没有造成危害后果的,免于行政处罚;
(三)违法事实不成立,予以撤案处理;
(四)违法行为已构成犯罪,移送司法机关处理。
案情特殊、情节复杂或者给予较重行政处罚的,行政执法部门应当召集案件承办人员、有关行政执法人员对案件的调查结果和处理建议进行讨论,部门负责人根据讨论结果报市知识产权局负责人审批。必要时,由市知识产权局的负责人集体讨论决定。
第十五条 市知识产权局在作出行政处罚决定前,应将《处罚决定事先告知书》送达当事人,告知当事人作出行政处罚决定的事实、理由和证据,以及当事人依法享有的权利。

  第十六条 对个人罚款一千元以上或者单位罚款三万元以上的,当事人可以自收到《处罚决定事先告知书》之日起3日内提出听证请求。

  第十七条 市知识产权局在举行听证的7日前,通知当事人举行听证的时间、地点。当事人可以亲自参加听证,也可委托一至二人代理听证;除涉及技术秘密等法律规定的不宜公开的情况外,听证公开举行。

  第十八条 听证由市知识产权局负责人指定的非本案承办人员主持;当事人认为主持人与本案有直接利害关系的,有权申请回避。
  举行听证时,案件承办人员提出当事人违法的事实、证据和行政处罚建议,当事人进行申辩和质证。听证应当制作笔录,笔录应当交当事人审核无误后签字或者盖章。
  听证结束后,听证主持人应当按照本办法第十四条第一款第(一)、(二)、(三)、(四)项提出处理建议。

  第十九条 对假冒他人专利行为确凿的单位或者个人,市知识产权局应当责令改正,没收违法所得,可以根据下列不同情况给予行政罚款:
(一)未经许可,在其销售的产品、产品的包装上标注他人的专利号的,处以违法所得的一倍以下的罚款;没有违法所得的,可处以一千元以上五千元以下罚款。
(二)有下列行为之一的,处以违法所得的一倍以上二倍以下的罚款;没有违法所得的,可处以五千元以上二万元以下罚款:

1、未经许可,在其制造的产品、产品的包装上标注他人的专利号;
2、未经许可,在广告或者其他宣传材料中使用他人的专利号,使人将所涉及的技术误认为是他人的专利技术。

(三)有下列行为之一的,处以违法所得的二倍以上三倍以下的罚款;没有违法所得的,可处以二万元以上五万元以下罚款:
1、未经许可,在合同中使用他人的专利号,使人将合同所涉及的技术误认为是他人的专利技术的;
2、伪造或者变造他人的专利证书、专利文件或者专利申请文件的。

  第二十条 冒充专利行为确凿的单位或者个人,市知识产权局应当责令改正,可以根据下列情形给予行政罚款:
(一)有下列行为之一的,处以一千元以上五千元以下罚款:
1、销售标有专利标记的非专利产品的;
2、专利权被宣告无效后,继续在销售的产品上标注专利标记的;

(二)有下列行为之一的,处以五千元以上二万元以下罚款:
1、制造标有专利标记的非专利产品的;
2、专利权被宣告无效后,继续在制造的产品上标注专利标记的;
3、在广告或者其他宣传材料中将非专利技术称为专利技术的。

(三)有下列行为之一的,处以二万元以上至五万元以下罚款:
1、在合同中将非专利技术称为专利技术的;
2、伪造或者变造专利证书、专利文件或者专利申请文件的。

  第二十一条 对于为假冒他人专利、冒充专利行为提供生产经营便利的行为的单位或者个人,市知识产权局责令改正;拒不改正的,没收违法所得,并处以一千元以上一万元以下罚款。

  第二十二条 当事人有下列情形之一的,应当从轻或者减轻行政处罚:
(一)主动消除或者减轻专利违法行为危害后果的;
(二)配合知识产权局查处专利违法行为有立功表现的;
(三)其他依法应当从轻或者减轻行政处罚的。

  第二十三条 市知识产权局作出行政处罚决定后,当事人应当在行政处罚决定规定的期限内,予以履行。

  第二十四条 当事人确有经济困难,需要延期或者分期缴纳罚款的,经当事人申请和市知识产权局批准,可以暂缓或者分期缴纳。

  第二十五条 当事人对市知识产权局作出的行政处罚决定不服的,可以在收到行政处罚决定书之日起60日内向上海市人民政府申请行政复议,或者在三个月内向上海市中级人民法院行政庭提起行政诉讼。
当事人对市知识产权局作出的行政处罚决定逾期不申请复议,不提起诉讼,又不履行的,市知识产权局可以申请人民法院强制执行。

  第二十六条 市知识产权局对专利违法行为作出行政处罚的,应当在上海知识产权网上予以公告。
  在法律规定的期限内,当事人不申请复议,不提起诉讼的,市知识产权局即予公告;当事人在规定的时间内申请复议或者提起诉讼的,经法院审理维持市知识产权局行政处罚决定后即予公告。

  第二十七条 案件承办人员对已执行完毕的案件填写结案审批表,报请市知识产权局负责人批准。





The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.


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